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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JASON MARTINEZ, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 970420-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from two convictions of aggravated 
assault, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Should this Court review a jury instruction under 
plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel where defendant 
purposefully did not object to the instruction and where the 
instructions viewed as a whole correctly stated the elements of 
the crime charged? 
Standard of Review: An appellate court will not review a 
jury instruction in the absence of a specific, distinct objection 
below, unless necessary to avoid manifest injustice, that is, 
plain error. Utah R. Crim. Proc. 19(c) (1997); State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989); State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 
1107, 1109 (Utah 1996). Plain error does not apply where counsel 
consciously chooses not to object or leads the court into error. 
State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989), cert, denied. 
497 U.S. 1024 (1990). To prevail under either a plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must also show 
that any error prejudiced him. State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 
174 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the State to call a witness not on its witness list 
where defendant was prejudiced? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's denial of a defendant's 
requested relief for a discovery violation is reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 
1987). 
Issue 3: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
allowing the investigating detective to give an opinion regarding 
how the crime occurred where the officer had extensive training 
and experience in investigating violent crimes and where the 
officer based his opinion on the physical evidence that he 
personally observed and on the statements of eyewitnesses, all of 
whom testified at trial? 
Standard of Review: "A trial court has discretion in 
determining whether a witness has adequate qualifications to 
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testify as an expert and in determining whether specific 
testimony offered by an expert should be allowed or exceeds the 
expert's qualifications." Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 
(Utah 1993) (citing to Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co,. 711 
P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The text of the following statutes and rules are contained 
Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996); 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1997); 
Rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (1997); 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence (1997). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An October 1995 information charged defendant, Jason 
Martinez, with two counts of second degree felony aggravated 
assault in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996), 
based on the allegation that defendant inflicted serious bodily 
injury on two victims (R. 06). A jury convicted defendant as 
charged in November 1996 (R. 219-20). 
Subsequently, defendant moved to arrest judgment or, 
alternatively, to reduce his convictions to third degree felonies 
on the ground that one of the jury instructions erroneously 
allowed the jury to convict him by finding only that he had used 
a dangerous weapon and not that he had inflicted serious bodily 
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injury1 (R. 233). The trial court granted defendant's motion by 
reducing his two convictions to third degree felonies (R. 258, 
259-60). The court sentenced defendant to two consecutive prison 
terms of zero-to-five years (R. 259-60; Tr. 703-04). 
After obtaining new counsel, defendant moved for a new 
trial, citing again to the alleged erroneous jury instruction and 
asserting that he was unfairly prejudiced when the trial court 
let the State call a witness not on the State's witness list (R. 
269, 278) . The State countered with a request that the trial 
court reinstate the original verdict of two second degree 
felonies (R. 307-09). The trial court denied both defendant's 
motion for a new trial and the State's request for reinstatement 
of the original verdict (R. 332). 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R. 334). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant stabbed his two unarmed victims in the back, 
causing one, a hemophiliac, permanent partial paralysis and the 
other permanent nerve damage to his right arm and shoulder. The 
following details are recited in the light most favorable to the 
jury verdict. State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 350, 351 (Utah 1996). 
*A person who commits aggravated assault by using a 
dangerous weapon, but who does not inflict serious bodily injury, 
is guilty of a third degree felony, whereas an assault, with or 
without a weapon, that results in an intentional infliction of 
serious bodily injury is a second degree felony. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (Supp. 1996). 
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Defendant's brother Eloy starts a fight 
In September 1995, Melissa Hernandez threw a keg party at 
her home in south Salt Lake County (Tr. 57, 163, 229, 473-74). 
After paying a five dollar cover charge, guests were given a 
sixteen ounce cup from they could drink all the beer they wanted 
(Tr. 182, 507, 575) . 
Brandon Gilger arrived at the party at about 9:30 p.m. with 
his friends Anthony Esparza and John Montoya (Tr. 58, 229, 296). 
Defendant arrived at about 11:00 p.m. with his older brother Eloy 
and four friends, including Kevin Lopez (Tr. 59, 487-88, 506, 
573-74). Because defendant and Eloy had been fishing earlier in 
the day, defendant had fishing equipment in his car, including a 
buck knife which he kept in a tool box (Tr. 573). 
At the party, Eloy, defendant, and others in their group 
became loud and intimidating (Tr. 59-60, 87-89, 90, 92, 299, 306-
07, 319). Eloy, who was quite intoxicated, became angry at Kevin 
Lopez and, while backing Lopez into a corner, began to egg Lopez 
on to hit him2 (Tr. 62, 488-89, 508, 532, 576). When another 
guest interceded by telling Eloy to "chill out," Eloy slugged him 
in the face (Tr. 489, 493, 508, 541, 577). 
Melissa Hernandez told Eloy and his group to leave and, when 
they would not, began yelling "Help get them out!" (Tr. 61, 63, 
2Eloy drank about a six pack before coming to the party and 
then drank about another six pack at the party (Tr. 532, 552). 
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94-95, 311, 475). Eloy, defendant, and his friends were then 
pushed out through the kitchen door and into the garage (Tr. 61, 
94-95, 475, 542, 578). Responding to the noise and Ms. 
Hernandez' cries, twenty to twenty-five of the other guests 
crowded into the garage to see what was happening (Tr. 61, 63-64, 
94-95, 167, 169, 187, 189, 297). 
A semi-circle formed around defendant and Eloy who, because 
of the increasing crowd, had been pushed toward the garage door 
(Tr. 64, 95, 190). By then Eloy and John Montoya were exchanging 
words and Eloy punched Montoya in the face (Tr. 64, 122-24, 168-
70, 197, 231, 248-49). The two continued to yell at each other 
while their friends restrained them (Tr. 63, 103, 170). At one 
point during the altercation, defendant stepped between the two 
and said, "Don't make me go to my car and get a gun" (Tr. 65, 
108, 124-25, 327). Although Brandon Gilger observed this 
altercation, he did not get involved or participate in any way 
because he is a hemophiliac and did not want to risk an injury 
(Tr. 60, 62, 64, 65, 95-97, 99). 
Continuing to yell "get them out," Melissa Hernandez opened 
the garage door and everyone spilled out onto the driveway (Tr. 
65-66, 99, 129-30, 192, 231). Shouting continued between Eloy, 
defendant, and the other guests until, provoked by something Eloy 
said, several guests began to chase Eloy (Tr. 170-72, 200, 215) . 
Both Eloy and defendant ran into the street, turned right, ran to 
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the corner, and then ran across the street to the Morrison home 
(Tr. 66-68, 199, 536, 546, 584, 611, State's Ex. 1). Most of the 
guests stopped once they reached the middle of the street, 
however, about five or six guests continued to pursue Eloy to the 
Morrison's driveway (Tr. 102, 107, 172, 200, 215). 
Eloy and Montoya continued their altercation as they moved 
towards the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 69-70, 101). At one point, 
Montoya, who had been running backwards and facing Eloy, fell in 
the street with Eloy falling on top of him (Tr. 69, 101). Both 
immediately got up and Eloy continued to run (Tr. 69, 547, 
State's Ex. 1). Someone ripped Eloy's shirt off him (Tr. 586). 
Defendant stabs Gilger and Montoya in the back 
Concerned that the party was out of control, Gilger decided 
to leave (Tr. 72). However, because Gilger had brought Montoya 
to the party, he and Justin Rowley walked across the street to 
ask Montoya to leave with them (Tr. 5, 106, 114, 129, 172). 
Gilger determined that if Montoya would not come, he would leave 
without him (Tr. 106). 
Gilger reached the Morrison's driveway and saw Montoya 
walking towards him (Tr. 71, 1047, 174). Gilger said, "Let's 
go," to Montoya and turned to leave (Tr. 72-73, 174). Gilger had 
taken no more than a few steps when defendant suddenly came 
running up behind him and stabbed him in the back (Tr. 73, 104, 
174, 236). Gilger immediately fell to the ground (Tr. 73, 174, 
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222, 236) . 
Thinking that Gilger had only been hit with a fist, Rowley 
encouraged him to get up (Tr. 174) . Just as Rowley realized that 
Gilger had been stabbed, he heard Montoya calling his name (Tr. 
175, 203, 211, 222). Rowley turned to see Montoya on the ground, 
face down, supporting himself with one hand (Tr. 175, 203, 207, 
222). Defendant was bending over Montoya and Rowley watched as 
defendant stabbed Montoya twice in the back or shoulder (Tr. 175, 
203, 207, 222) .3 
Anthony Esparza, who was standing across the street in the 
Hernandez yard, saw defendant stab Gilger from behind and flee 
(Tr. 238) . Esparza chased defendant down the street, but 
defendant escaped when a car stopped and picked him up (Tr. 245). 
Meanwhile, Eloy ran up to Gilger as he lay on the ground, and 
stated, "See what you get for fucking with us Martinez boys? See 
what you get?" (Tr. 109, 130). 
Neither Gilger nor Montoya were armed or engaged in any kind 
of a confrontation with defendant or Eloy at the time defendant 
3There was conflicting testimony regarding whom defendant 
stabbed first. Montoya testified that defendant stabbed him 
first and that Montoya watched as defendant stabbed Gilger (Tr. 
301). Gilger testified that after defendant stabbed him he fell 
and turned in time to see defendant running, however, he could 
not see what had happened to Montoya during that time (Tr. 73-
75). Defendant testified that he first stabbed Montoya and then 
stabbed Gilger (Tr. 598). Justin Rowley was the only person who 
testified that he actually saw defendant stabbing Montoya after 
Gilger had been stabbed. 
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stabbed them (Tr. 129, 173, 174, 177, 238, 301). The single stab 
wound to Gilger's back partially severed his spinal column (Tr. 
504). As a result, Gilger suffered permanent partial paralysis; 
he cannot run and can walk only with the aid of a cane (Tr. 78-
80). Gilger also lost all feeling on his left side and control 
over his bowel and bladder (Tr. 79). 
Montoya received four stab wounds, two of them behind the 
right shoulder and the other two in his back right flank (Tr. 
223, 321, 341, 387, 389). The knife cut the arteries and nerves 
in Montoya's right arm (Tr. 303). As a result, Montoya will 
never regain full use of his right shoulder and he cannot pick up 
heavy objects with his fingers (Tr. 303). 
Significantly, neither Montoya nor Gilger had any wounds on 
the front of their bodies or any defensive wounds on their hands, 
feet, or other extremities (Tr. 387-88). The witnesses were 
nearly unanimous that other than defendant's knife, there were no 
weapons or implements that could be or were being used as weapons' 
4Defense witness Mark Delgado was the only witness to 
testify that he saw any weapons (Tr. 510, 520). He claimed to 
have seen two or three bats and several bricks in the Hernandez 
home during the party (Tr. 510, 520). Delgado also stated that 
he saw Eloy get hit with a brick and tackled by a crowd of people 
who kicked and beat Eloy with baseball bats (Tr. 525). That 
testimony, however, was contradicted by all the other witnesses, 
including Eloy who testified that although he fell down, no one 
tackled him, beat him, or kicked him (Tr. 540-41, 547, 549). 
Eloy did claim that some people threw rocks at him, but denied 
that he was ever hit by anything (Tr. 538, 549, 553). Even 
defendant conceded that he never saw anyone else wield a weapon 
and that he did not see any bricks, baseball bats, or rocks being 
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(Tr. 69, 70, 169, 179, 215, 240, 291-92, 304, 353, 355, 452, 482, 
483) . 
Defendant lies to police 
After fleeing the crime scene, defendant went to his 
girlfriend's apartment where he changed his clothes (Tr. 394-95, 
595, 97). Later that day, defendant met with Detective Keith 
Stephens (Tr. 391-92). Although defendant admitted that he had 
been at the party and had been chased away, he denied having 
stabbed or otherwise injured anyone (Tr. 393). Detective 
Stephens repeatedly suggested to defendant that it would be 
difficult to change his story later, even to claim self-defense, 
but defendant continued to deny that he had stabbed anyone (Tr. 
393-940, 605). 
Defendant gave Detective Stephens permission to retrieve his 
clothing from his girlfriend's apartment, but when the detective 
arrived there the girlfriend was unable to find the clothing 
where defendant claimed to have put it (Tr. 395-96). Defendant 
did not produce the sweatshirt he had been wearing that night 
used or thrown, although he did claim that while running he felt 
something whiz past his ear which he surmised to be a club or 
pipe (Tr. 610, 612, 621). 
Police who arrived on the scene only minutes after the 
stabbings found no evidence of any bricks or rocks being thrown 
or baseball bats being used to hit anyone (Tr. 351-53, 355, 368) . 
Furthermore, Detective Stephens testified that when he 
interviewed Eloy and defendant on the day of the altercation, he 
did not observe any injuries on either one that might have been 
caused by a weapon or being hit by a brick (Tr. 372, 413, 451-
52) . 
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until the preliminary hearing (Tr. 397). 
In July 1996, seven months after the stabbings and five 
months after his preliminary hearing, defendant and his attorney 
met with Detective Stephens at the crime scene to discuss 
defendant's version of the events (Tr. 388). At that time, 
defendant admitted for the first time that he had committed the 
stabbings, but claimed that it was in self-defense (Tr. 398). 
At trial, defendant testified that he took his fishing knife 
into the party with him (Tr. 578). Defendant also stated that he 
drew the knife in the garage and held it in his right hand when 
the other guests were confronting him and Eloy (Tr. 606-07). 
Defendant did not explain why no one else in the garage saw the 
knife then, or how he was able to hold his brother back with his 
right hand, as he claimed to do, while holding the knife (Tr. 
543-44, 606-07).5 
5The State's theory was that defendant retrieved the knife 
from his car after the trouble started (Tr. 680). This theory 
contradicts defendant's self-defense theory because if defendant 
had retrieved the knife from the car he could easily have escaped 
without inflicting any harm. 
The State's theory was supported by the fact that neither 
Eloy, nor anyone else, noticed the knife until the stabbings (Tr. 
179, 497, 543-44). Furthermore, after going fishing that 
morning, Eloy and defendant attended their brother's wedding (Tr. 
572). After returning from the wedding, defendant gathered his 
friends and Eloy to go the Hernandez party (Tr. 572-74). The 
jury could have reasonably believed that it was unlikely that 
defendant would carry a large fishing knife in his pocket to his 
brother's wedding and then to the party. Defendant also 
initially testified that he kept the knife in a tool box in his 
car (Tr. 573) . In addition, Gilger testified that several months 
after the stabbings, Kevin Lopez told him that defendant had 
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Although defendant claimed that about fifteen people chased 
him and Eloy into the street, he conceded that there were only 
five or six people in the general area of the stabbings (Tr. 
600). He also admitted that although he initially feared for 
Eloy's safety, he believed that Eloy had escaped before the 
stabbings (Tr. 589). 
Defendant testified that when he started to make his own 
escape, he came face-to-face with Montoya, who charged at him and 
tried to wrestle him to the ground (Tr. 591-92, 620). Defendant 
asserted that while he was falling backward with Montoya on top, 
defendant reached his right hand around and behind Montoya's left 
side, and stabbed Montoya several times in his right shoulder and 
right lower back (Tr. 622-23). Defendant maintained that he 
continued to inflict wounds on Montoya's right side as defendant 
was falling backwards and that he stopped only after Montoya fell 
off him (Tr. 593, 624) . 
Defendant testified that after he stabbed Montoya, he turned 
to flee but saw six people, including Gilger, approaching him 
(Tr. 593-94, 625). Rather than turning and running the other 
way, defendant ran through the six young men, stabbing Gilger 
admitted to Lopez that he had gotten the knife from the car (Tr. 
635). Although the trial court admitted this testimony only to 
impeach Lopez's denial of this statement, it was nevertheless 
admissible as substantive evidence as a prior inconsistent 
statement under rule 801(d)(1)(A). See Kimball & Boyce, Utah 
Evidence Law 8-15 to 8-17 (1996); State v. Ramsey. 782 P.2d 480, 
483-84 (Utah 1989) (plurality opinion). 
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once in the back as he did so (Tr. 593-94, 625-26, 627). 
Defendant asserted that he feared for his life at the time 
of the stabbings, but conceded that both victims were unarmed at 
the time of the attack and that he never saw any weapons or 
anyone throwing anything at Eloy or himself (Tr. 621, 625). 
Defendant admitted that he lied to Detective Stephens when he 
denied having stabbed anyone (Tr. 596). 
Justin Rowley allowed to testify 
Defendant made a timely discovery request for a list of all 
the witnesses that the State intended to call at trial (R. 13, 
25). Approximately ten days before trial, the prosecutor became 
aware for the first time that Justin Rowley was a potential 
witness for the State (Tr. 9, 11, 13). However, the prosecutor 
did not immediately inform defendant of Rowley's existence 
because the prosecutor did not have an address for Rowley or know 
how to contact him (Tr. 9, 13). 
Trial was scheduled to begin on Tuesday, November 12, 1998 
(Tr. 6). Late afternoon on the Thursday before trial, the 
prosecutor learned how Rowley might be contacted (Tr. 9, 10). 
The following day, between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m., the prosecutor 
personally faxed a notice that he intended to call Rowley as a 
witness because he had just realized that his secretary had 
failed to so earlier as he had requested (Tr. 7-8). 
The Monday before trial was a holiday, however, defense 
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counsel had seen the notice by then because he call Detective 
Stephens to inquire about Rowley (Tr. 14). The prosecutor was 
unable to speak with Rowley until the morning of trial to see 
whether the State could actually use him as a witness (Tr, 8, 
12). 
Immediately prior to trial, defendant asked the Court to 
exclude Rowley as a witness (Tr. 11). Defendant claimed that the 
lack of timely notice made it impossible for him to "check into 
[Rowley's] background, history, any false statements he's made in 
the past on loan applications or rental applications or anything 
of that nature" (Tr. 11). 
The trial court denied defendant's request to exclude 
Rowley's testimony, but ordered the State to turn over any 
information it had on Rowley's background, including any criminal 
history (Tr. 22-23). The State disclosed that Rowley had three 
prior convictions, one for misdemeanor theft and two for 
marijuana possession (Tr. 24, 151). Defendant asked that Rowley 
not be allowed to testify until the following day so that he 
would have time to investigate the underlying facts for the theft 
conviction to see if it could be used to impeach Rowley (Tr. 26). 
Agreeing that defendant was entitled to explore that information, 
the trial court stated its willingness to give defendant time to 
obtain Rowley's files, but suggested that it would be more 
expeditious for defendant to simply voir dire Rowley regarding 
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the prior conviction (Tr. 26-27). 
The second day of trial, defense counsel was provided a copy 
of Rowley's "rap sheet" and allowed to question Rowley regarding 
his prior convictions (Tr. 152-56). Subsequently, the trial 
court determined that the theft conviction did not go to Rowley's 
credibility (Tr. 156). Defendant did not question Rowley about 
the substance of his proposed testimony (Tr. 152-56). Defendant 
unsuccessfully renewed his objection to Rowley's testifying on 
the ground that the prosecutor knew of the witness for at least 
ten days before trial and could have given more notice (Tr. 156). 
Once Rowley testified, defendant vigorously cross-examined 
him regarding his biases, how much he had to drink, and the 
accuracy of his recollection (Tr. 181-84, 204-07, 226). 
Detective Stephens' testimony 
After Gilger, Rowley, Esparza, and Montoya testified, the 
State called Detective Keith Stephens, a fifteen-year veteran of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Department (Tr. 364). Detective 
Stephens who was on his department's homicide unit had been 
assigned to investigate this case (Tr. 364). 
Detective Stephens testified that he had personally viewed 
the crime scene and both victims' wounds (Tr. 373, 384, 385). He 
also interviewed the victims, defendant and his brother, and 
other witnesses (Tr. 369-72, 392-94, 401, 407-09). 
Using State's Exhibit 1, a diagram of the area where the 
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stabbing occurred, and various photos introduced as State's 
exhibits, the detective showed the jury where Gilger collapsed on 
the lower part of the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 373-74, 381, 
State's Ex. Nos. 3, 4, 8, 9, 13). Detective Stephens also used 
several photos to point out a trail of blood that began in the 
Morrison's driveway above where Gilger collapsed and wove down 
the driveway towards and then away from Gilger and down the 
sidewalk (Tr. 373-74, 381, 383-84, 410, 464-65, State's Ex. Nos. 
3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13). The trail ended in a large pool of 
blood where Montoya had collapsed on the sidewalk several feet 
from the Morrison's driveway (Tr. 381, 383-84, 464-65, State's 
Ex. Nos. 10, 12) . 
Over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed 
Detective Stephens to give his opinion on how the crime occurred 
(Tr. 381-82). Based on the physical evidence he observed at the 
crime scene, the victim's wounds, and the witness accounts of 
Gilger, Montoya, Esparza, Rowley, defendant, and Eloy, the 
detective testified that he believed that defendant first stabbed 
Montoya in the back in the Morrison's driveway near their garage 
(Tr. 383). The detective then testified that Montoya began 
walking away, thereby explaining the blood trail (Tr. 383-84). 
Based on Gilger's and Rowley's testimony that they could not see 
where defendant came from, the detective believed that defendant 
then ran around a camper truck parked in the driveway and stabbed 
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Gilger in the back (Tr. 383) . According to the detective, 
defendant then ran past Montoya a second time (Tr. 383). This 
supported Rowley's testimony that after Gilger was stabbed, he 
saw defendant bending over and stabbing a fallen Montoya.6 
The detective also testified that the wounds the victims 
suffered were puncture wounds, all to the back, and that neither 
the victims nor defendant had any defensive wounds (Tr. 387-88, 
451). 
Defendant objected to this testimony on the ground that the 
detective was not qualified as a blood spatter or accident 
reconstructionist and because his opinion was based on hearsay 
(Tr. 380-381). 
Additional relevant facts are included in the argument 
sections below. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I; Jury Instruction. Trial counsel's affidavit states 
that he consciously decided to not object to Instruction 16 to 
avoid annoying the jury and in the hope that the "plain error" 
contained in the instruction would later benefit defendant on 
6The detective based his opinion in part on Montoya's and 
defendant's testimony that Montoya had been stabbed first and 
Gilger second (Tr. 383, 384, 403). Using the blood trail as a 
guide, the detective was able to pinpoint where Montoya stood 
when he was stabbed (Tr. 383). The detective's testimony that 
defendant ran towards and passed Montoya a second time is based 
on Rowley's testimony and its consistency with the physical 
evidence (Tr. 415). 
17 
appeal if convicted. This conscious choice amounted to invited 
error, thereby foreclosing appellate review under the plain error 
doctrine. In any event, although partially erroneous, 
Instruction 16 was harmless when viewed as a whole with the 
remaining instructions. 
Point II; Discovery Violation. The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the State to call a witness not 
on its witness list because the defendant has not made the 
requisite credible argument that the discovery violation impaired 
his defense. Moreover, in view of the overwhelming evidence 
negating defendant's self-defense claim, any error in allowing 
the witness to testify was harmless. 
Point III: Expert Testimony. Detective Stephens was 
qualified by virtue of his extensive training and experience to 
testify to give an opinion as to how the crime occurred, based on 
the physical evidence personally observed by him and on the in-
court testimony of eyewitnesses. Contrary to defendant's 
assertions, the detective's opinion was not based wholly on 
hearsay, but was based on his personal observations of the 
physical evidence and on the testimony and evidence before the 
jury. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in allowing the detective to testify as an expert. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENSE COUNSEL MADE A CONSCIOUS DECISION TO 
NOT OBJECT TO INSTRUCTION 16, PLAIN ERROR DOES NOT 
APPLY; ADDITIONALLY, DEFENDANT DID NOT MEET THE 
REQUISITE PREJUDICE PRONG UNDER EITHER PLAIN ERROR OR 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE THE 
INSTRUCTIONS, WHEN VIEWED AS A WHOLE, DID NOT CONFUSE 
THE JURY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (Supp. 1996) provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits 
assault as defined in Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a 
violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a dangerous 
weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. 
An assault under subsection (1)(a) is a second degree felony, 
whereas an assault under (1)(b) is a third degree felony. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (2)& (3). In this case, defendant was charged 
with two counts of second degree felony aggravated assault on the 
theory that he caused serious bodily injury to Montoya and Gilger 
(R. 06-07) . 
Defendant challenges the giving of Instruction 16, which 
states: 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person 
commits assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily 
injury to another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily 
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injury.7 
(Tr. 200; Addendum B). Defendant characterizes this instruction 
as a lesser-included offense instruction that allowed the jury to 
convict him of aggravated assault without being unanimous as to 
whether he committed a second degree felony by intentionally 
inflicting serious bodily injury or a third degree felony by 
using a dangerous weapon likely to produce death or serious 
bodily injury. Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. App.] 21. 
Although defendant did not object to this instruction below, 
he asks this Court to excuse his failure under the doctrine of 
plain error or under an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
The plain error doctrine, however, does not apply here because 
trial counsel, by his own admission, consciously chose not to 
object, thereby inviting the complained-of error. Furthermore, 
defendant cannot establish that the giving of the instruction was 
prejudicial error for purposes of either plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel because, when viewed as a 
whole, the instructions clearly explained to the jury that to 
convict defendant, it must first unanimously find that he 
inflicted serious bodily injury on his two victims. 
7Both in his motion to arrest judgment and in his appellate 
brief, defendant cites to Instruction 15 as the erroneous 
instruction (R. 233, Br. App. 13-14, Addendum III) . However, the 
complained-of instruction as given to the jury is actually 
Instruction 16 (R. 200). 
20 
A. Defendant invited the complained-of error, thereby making the 
plain error doctrine inapplicable. 
Rule 19(c), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, precludes a 
party from challenging a jury instruction on appeal unless he 
makes a specific and distinct objection before the jury is 
instructed or the review is necessary "to avoid a manifest 
injustice." The standard for determining whether to review a 
claim under rule 19(c) for manifest injustice is that of plain 
error. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996); State 
v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 121-22 (Utah 1989); State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
The plain error doctrine "exists to permit review of trial 
court rulings as a way of protecting a defendant from the harm 
that can be caused by less-than-perfect counsel." State v. 
Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). That doctrine does not 
apply, however, when "a party through counsel has made a 
conscious decision to refrain from objecting or has led the trial 
court into error." Bullock, 791 P.2d at 158; see also State 
v.Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996); State v. Hall, 946 P.2d 
712, 716 (Utah App. 1997); State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 
(Utah App. 1991). The purpose of this rule, known as "invited 
error," is to give the trial court the first opportunity to 
correct any errors and to discourage parties from "intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for 
reversal on appeal." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109. 
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Here, defense counsel, by his own admission, led the trial 
court into error by consciously deciding to not object to 
Instruction 16. After being convicted, defendant moved the trial 
court to either arrest judgment or to reduce his convictions to 
third degree felonies on the ground that Instruction 16 may have 
confused the jury and allowed it to convict him on the sole 
finding that he used a dangerous weapon (R. 233). The trial 
court agreed and reduced defendant's convictions to third degree 
felonies (R. 258, 259-60). 
Defendant subsequently obtained new counsel and moved for a 
new trial, again on the ground that Instruction 16 improperly 
allowed the jury convict him without being unanimous on whether 
his conduct constituted a second or third degree felony (R. 269, 
279-80, 282-86). Defendant claimed that his attorney was 
ineffective for not objecting to Instruction 16 (R. 289-91). To 
support his contention, defendant attached an affidavit from his 
trial counsel stating that he had objected to Instruction 16 off 
the record in chambers and that he was led to understand the 
instruction would not be given (R. 293; a copy of the affidavit 
is included in Addendum C). Counsel also claimed that both 
parties were then given the opportunity to place their objections 
to any of the instructions on the record (R. 294). According to 
trial counsel, he did not object to Instruction 16 on the record 
because he believed that it had already been settled that it 
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would not be given8 (R. 294) . 
The affidavit then stated that when the trial court began 
reading the instructions to the jury, defense counsel 
"immediately noted a problem and flipped to Instruction No. [16]" 
(Addendum C, 294). Defense counsel averred that although he knew 
then that the instruction should not have been included, he 
nevertheless decided "to wait until the instructions were 
complete for a more opportune time to advise the Court of the 
error" (Addendum C, 294-95). Based on "the vibes of the jury," 
counsel believed an objection at that point would cause jurors to 
resent defendant (Addendum C, 294-95). Defense counsel explained 
his failure to subsequently ask for a curative instruction as 
follows: 
I do not recall whether I failed to ask for a curative 
instruction because I felt that interrupting would cause bad 
feelings against the defense by the jurors and that the 
error was not of great significance to our self defense 
theory, whether I simply overlooked the error once we were 
into closing arguments, whether I made a split second 
decision not to object because the error was plain and would 
benefit my client in the event of an adverse verdictf or 
because of a combination of the above. 
(Addendum C, 295) (emphasis added). 
As evidenced by the foregoing, although trial counsel 
8Because there is no record of what occurred in chambers, 
defense counsel's affidavit contains the only allegation of what 
occurred there. The State does not concede or agree with defense 
counsel's version of what happened in chambers. Nevertheless, 
because, as demonstrated below, defense counsel invited error by 
consciously deciding not to object, whether he objected to the 
instruction off the record is beside the point. 
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believed that Instruction 16 was erroneous, he purposefully chose 
not to make a timely objection because he believed that doing so 
would cause the jury to view his client unfavorably. Trial 
counsel then purposefully failed to ask for a curative 
instruction because he decided that the error would not have a 
significant impact on defendant's self-defense theory and because 
he made a "split second decision" not to object in the hope that 
the "plain error" would later benefit defendant on appeal if 
convicted.9 And, in fact, trial counsel later capitalized on 
Instruction 16 by using it to convince the trial court that it 
should reduce defendant's convictions to third degree felonies. 
Trial counsel's failure to object so that he could preserve 
a hidden ground for post-trial or appellate relief is exactly the 
kind of conscious decision that the invited error doctrine seeks 
to prevent. See Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159. Consequently, this 
Court should decline to review defendant's claim under the plain 
error doctrine. 
^hile it is true that defense counsel also implied that the 
failure to ask for a curative instruction might have been an 
oversight, the primary thrust of his affidavit is that he 
consciously chose not to object because he did not want to annoy 
the jury and because he believed that allowing the error would 
ultimately benefit his client. 
24 
B. Even if the plain error doctrine did apply, defendant has not 
shown that the instruction was prejudicial. 
Even if the plain error doctrine did apply, defendant has 
not shown that Instruction 16 amounted to plain error. To obtain 
a review under plain error, an appellant must show that 1) the 
error should have been obvious to the trial court, and 2) the 
error was harmful, i.e., that absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been different. 
Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109; Verde, 770 
P.2d at 122-23; State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah App. 
1992). 
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant could meet the first 
requirement, he cannot meet the second. Defendant claims that 
Instruction 16 denied him a unanimous jury verdict because it 
essentially asked the jury "to consider convicting [him] on a 
lesser [aggravated assault by using a dangerous weapon], but not 
an included offense." Br. App. at 21. Defendant asserts that 
the instruction was prejudicial because if it had not been given, 
the jury would have acquitted him because of his "consistent" 
claim of self-defense. Br. App. at 27. 
Defendant mischaracterizes the nature and intent of 
Instruction 16. That instruction is not a lesser-included 
offense instruction, nor does it operate as one. It does not 
tell the jury that it may convict defendant of aggravated assault 
if it finds that defendant used a dangerous weapon. Rather, it 
25 
merely sets forth the general statutory definition of aggravated 
assault. Unfortunately, in addition to the definition of the 
charged crime of second degree felony aggravated assault, the 
instruction also erroneously includes the definition of third 
degree felony aggravated assault, which was not charged. 
The error, however, was harmless when viewed with all the 
other instructions. See State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 
1981) (jury instructions are not to be viewed singly, but must be 
considered and construed as a whole); State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 
33, 35 (Utah 1980) (same). Immediately following Instruction 16, 
were two elements instructions that clearly and correctly stated 
the elements of second degree felony assault. Instruction 17 
instructed the jury that before it could convict defendant of 
Count I, it had to find each of the following elements: 
1. That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted 
Brandon Gilger; and 
2. That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to Brandon Gilger. 
(R. 201) (emphasis added). That instruction did not mention 
anything about using a dangerous weapon. Similarly, Instruction 
18 told the jury that before it could convict defendant of Count 
II, it must find that defendant assaulted and intentionally 
inflicted serious bodily injury on Montoya (R. 202). Again, 
there was no mention of the use of a dangerous weapon (R. 202). 
Likewise, Instruction 1 set forth verbatim the information, 
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alleging that defendant committed aggravated assault "by 
intentionally causing serious bodily injury" to Brandon Gilger 
and Robert Montoya (R. 185). This instruction also did not 
mention anything about a dangerous weapon. Another instruction 
informed the jury that it should not single out any sentence or 
individual point in the instructions, but that it should 
"consider the instructions as a whole, and . . . regard each in 
the light of all others" (R. 187). The jury also received an 
instruction that it must be unanimous in its verdict (R. 216). 
(Instructions 1, 3, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 32 are contained in 
Addendum B.) In sum, the only instruction out of thirty-two that 
even mentioned the dangerous weapon element of third degree 
felony aggravated assault was Instruction No. 16. 
The harmlessness of Instruction 16 is supported by the 
prosecutor's closing argument where he carefully explained to the 
jury that to find defendant guilty, it had to first find that 
defendant assaulted Gilger and Montoya and that defendant 
"intentionally caused serious bodily injury both as to [Gilger] 
and as to [Montoya]" (Tr. 647). The prosecutor never argued or 
implied that the jury could convict defendant if they only found 
that defendant used a dangerous weapon (Tr. 645-48). 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, it is also unlikely that 
the jury would have acquitted him if Instruction 16 had not been 
given. Defendant never disputed that he stabbed the victims, 
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that he used a dangerous weapon to do so, o,r that he caused 
serious bodily injury. The only disputed issue at trial was 
whether defendant acted in self-defense. If the jury had 
believed defendant's claim of self-defense it would have had to 
acquit him, regardless of whether he inflicted serious bodily 
injury or merely used a dangerous weapon.10 
In short, it is unlikely that the jury misunderstood the 
instructions and found defendant guilty without first unanimously 
finding that he intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury on 
his two victims. See, e.g.. State v. Carlson, 934 P.2d 657, 661 
(Utah App. 1997) (erroneous instruction allowing jury to infer 
that defendant actually stole vehicle when he was only charged 
with possession of a stolen vehicle was harmless error where 
remaining instructions clearly informed jury that defendant was 
charged only with possession of stolen vehicle and gave only 
elements of that crime). Defendant, therefore, cannot show that 
the giving of Instruction 16 was prejudicial. 
C. Trial counsel was not ineffective because defendant cannot 
show prejudice. 
Defendant also seeks review of Instruction 16 under an 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A claim based on 
10Indeed, defendant obtained more than he was entitled to 
when he convinced the trial court to reduce his convictions to 
third degree felonies. As stated, it is highly unlikely that the 
jury did not unanimously find both that defendant inflicted 
serious bodily injury and that he used a dangerous weapon as both 
those points were undisputed. 
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ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on 
appeal presents a question of law. State v. Callahan. 866 P.2d 
590, 593 (Utah App. 1995). To establish ineffective assistance 
of counsel, defendant must overcome a strong presumption that his 
counsel's representation met an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that but for the identified omissions or acts 
of trial counsel, there was a "reasonable probability" of a more 
favorable outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 
694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984); State v. Ellifritz. 835 
P.2d 170, 173 (Utah App. 1992). 
A common standard applies to both plain error and 
ineffective assistance of counsel in that "[f]ailure to meet the 
plain error requirement of prejudice means that defendant 
likewise fails to meet the required showing under the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard." Ellifritz, 835 P.2d at 174 
(citing to Verde. 770 P.2d at 124 n.15). As stated, defendant 
has failed show that he was prejudiced by Instruction 16 when it 
is viewed in the context of all the other instructions, 
particularly the elements instructions. Defendant, therefore, 
has not shown that he was denied his right to the effective 
assistance of counsel. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING JUSTIN ROWLEY TO TESTIFY BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT MADE A CREDIBLE ARGUMENT THAT 
HIS DEFENSE WAS IMPAIRED BY THE LACK OF TIMELY 
NOTICE; EVEN IF DEFENDANT HAD RECEIVED TIMELY 
NOTICE, THERE IS NOT A REASONABLE LIKELIHOOD OF A 
DIFFERENT OUTCOME. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in allowing Justin Rowley to testify. Br. App. 30-31. Defendant 
asserts that Rowley's testimony that defendant stabbed Gilger 
first and Montoya second completely changed the State's theory of 
the case and that defendant was unable to effectively meet this 
damaging testimony. Br. App. 31-32. Defendant, however, has not 
alleged, much less shown, how his defense was impaired by the 
delayed notice. Moreover, defendant's claim of prejudice is 
belied by the abundant evidence outside of Rowley's testimony 
that defendant did not act in self-defense. 
A. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying 
requested relief for a discovery violation unless defendant first 
makes a credible argument that the discovery violation impaired 
his defense, and it is shown that the discovery violation was 
prejudicial. 
Rule 16(g), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides that 
if a trial court becomes aware that a party has failed to comply 
with discovery rules, "the court may order such party to permit 
the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the 
party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter 
such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." In 
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this case, the prosecutor, albeit unintentionally, violated the 
discovery rules by not notifying defendant sooner that Rowley was 
a possible witness. 
However, under rule 16(g), a trial court has "ample power to 
obviate any prejudice resulting from a breach of the criminal 
discovery rules." State v. Knight. 734 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 
1987); see also State v. Larson. 775 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989). 
Under this rule, a trial court abuses its discretion in denying a 
defendant's requested relief only when "taking into account any 
remedial measures ordered by the trial court," the defendant is 
prejudiced and "the remedial measure requested but refused would 
have obviated this prejudice." Kniaht, 734 P.2d at 918, 921. 
Furthermore, to constitute reversible error, there must be a 
reasonable likelihood that without the prosecutor's error there 
would have been a more favorable result for the defendant.11 Id. 
at 919, 921. A "mere possibility" of a different outcome is not 
enough, rather the "likelihood of a different outcome must be 
sufficiently high to undermine confidence in the verdict." Id. 
at 920. 
To prevail on a claim of prejudice for a rule 16 discovery 
nIt is important to note that the test for determining 
prejudice for a discovery violation is whether there is a 
sufficient likelihood of a different outcome in the absence of 
the prosecutor's failure to comply with rule 16. It is not 
whether there is a sufficient likelihood of a different outcome 
if the trial court's ruling had been different. Kniaht. 734 P.2d 
at 920-21. 
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violation, the defendant must first make a credible argument that 
he was impaired by the prosecutor's failure to timely disclose 
the requested material. Id. at 921. Only then does the State 
have the burden to persuade the court that absent the discovery 
violation, there is not a reasonable likelihood that the outcome 
of the trial would have been favorable for the defendant. Id. 
B. Defendant has not made a credible argument that the 
prosecutor's delayed notice impaired his defense. 
In this case, defendant has not made a credible argument 
that the lack of notice that Rowley would testify impaired his 
defense. On appeal, defendant does not state how he would have 
changed his defense or strategy or how he would have been better 
prepared to meet Rowley's testimony had he been notified ten or 
more days earlier that Rowley was going to testify. Defendant 
argues only that the testimony of Rowley was prejudicial and 
makes the bald assertion that he was unable to effectively 
confront this testimony. Br. App. 31-32. Absent at least a 
specific allegation how more notice would have better prepared 
him to cross-examine Rowley, defendant has not made the requisite 
credible showing. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in permitting Rowley to testify. 
C. Absent the discovery violation, there is not a reasonable 
likelihood that the outcome at trial would have been different. 
Even assuming that a credible showing has been made that the 
defense was impaired by the untimely notice, there is not a 
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reasonable likelihood that absent the prosecutor's error the 
outcome at trial would have been different. 
Defendant essentially asserts that Rowley's testimony 
completely changed the State's theory of the case and that he was 
not prepared to meet this testimony. Br. App. 30-32. Defendant 
bases this assertion on the fact that Rowley was the only witness 
who testified that he watched as defendant stabbed Gilger first 
and Montoya second while Montoya was falling to the ground. Br. 
App. 30. This testimony allowed the State to argue that 
defendant actually stabbed Montoya first, Gilger second, and then 
returned to stab Montoya a second time12 (Tr. 4 64, 653). 
Although Rowley's testimony was certainly damaging to 
defendant's self-defense theory, it did not result in a complete 
change in the State's theory of the case. The State's theory was 
always that defendant intentionally stabbed his victims and that 
he did not act in self-defense. Rowley's testimony merely 
provided additional evidence to the already overwhelming evidence 
that defendant did not act in self-defense. 
As already noted, the real issue here is not whether 
Rowley's testimony was prejudicial; it is whether the defendant 
could have achieved a different outcome if he had had more notice 
that Rowley would testify. In other words, would defendant have 
,2The rest of Rowley's testimony was cumulative to that of 
the other witnesses. 
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been more likely to convince the jury that he acted in self-
defense had he known earlier of Rowley's testimony. 
A review of the entire record makes clear that even if 
Rowley had not testified, it is unlikely that the jury would have 
found that defendant acted in self-defense. First, all the stab 
wounds were to the back (Tr. 73, 78-80, 223, 236, 238, 303, 321, 
504). Indeed, Montoya was stabbed four times in the back of 
right shoulder and lower back, thereby negating a suggestion that 
defendant used only the force reasonably necessary to protect 
himself (Tr. 303, 321). Neither of the victims nor defendant or 
his brother had any defensive wounds (Tr. 387-88, 451). The stab 
wounds themselves were puncture wounds as opposed to the slashing 
wounds one would expect if defendant had acted in self-defense 
(Tr. 385-87). The evidence was nearly uncontroverted that 
defendant was the only person at the party with a weapon.13 
Defendant himself admitted that neither Gilger nor Montoya had 
weapons (Tr. 621, 625). Defendant's self-serving testimony was 
the only evidence that Gilger and Montoya were threatening him 
(Tr. 591-92, 620, 593-94, 625). All other witnesses to the 
actual stabbing testified that neither Gilger nor Montoya 
threatened or approached defendant (Tr. 60-66, 72-73, 99, 174, 
236, 238). Defendant's own story that he had inflicted four 
puncture knife wounds to Montoya's right shoulder and flank by 
13See note 6, supra. 
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reaching his right hand around Montoya's left side as defendant 
fell was unbelievable and not supported by the physical evidence 
at trial14 (Tr. 591-92, 620-23). The jury was also unlikely to 
believe that Gilger, a hemophiliac, would risk his life by 
intentionally getting involved in an altercation with defendant. 
Finally, defendant initially lied to police and tried to cover-up 
his involvement in the stabbings, claiming self-defense for the 
first time several months later (Tr. 395-96-88, 596). 
In sum, given the overwhelming evidence that defendant did 
not act in self-defense, even if defendant could have rebutted 
Rowley's testimony that he stabbed Gilger first and Montoya 
second, it is highly unlikely that the outcome would have been 
different. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing Rowley to testify. 
14For example, such a scenario would have likely resulted in 
slashing wounds to Montoya's back instead of the puncture wounds 
he actually suffered. Additionally, if Montoya had fallen off 
defendant to the ground, one would expect there to be blood 
pooling at the point of stabbing. Instead, there was only a 
trail of small drops of blood, beginning at the top of the 
Morrison's driveway where Montoya was stabbed and ending in a 
large pool of blood several feet down the sidewalk where Montoya 
eventually collapsed (Tr. 373-74, 381, 383-84, State's Ex. 3, 4, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
PERMITTING THE DETECTIVE TO GIVE HIS OPINION BASED 
ON THE PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AT THE CRIME SCENE AND 
THE TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES OF HOW THE STABBINGS 
OCCURRED. 
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in allowing Detective Stephens to give his opinion on how the 
altercation occurred because 1) the detective was not an expert 
in blood spatter and accident reconstruction, and 2) the 
detective did not testify from personal knowledge, but merely 
related out-of-court information, i.e., hearsay, as a basis for 
his recreation of the crime. Br. App. at 32-35. 
Detective Stephens' training and experience, however, 
qualified him as an expert regarding the testimony he gave, which 
was his interpretation of physical evidence in light of 
eyewitness testimony, the type and location of the knife wounds, 
and the absence of any defensive wounds on the victims or 
defendant. Also, the detective did not merely relate the hearsay 
statements of eyewitnesses, but he explained the physical 
evidence to the jury and how that evidence fit within the context 
of the testimony of witnesses presented at trial. 
A. Detective Stephen's training and experience qualified him as 
an expert for the purposes for which he testified. 
Rule 702, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides that "[if] 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist 
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a 
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fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, 
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in 
the form of an opinion or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 702 (1997). 
Thus, under rule 702, an witness need not have formal training or 
education before giving an expert opinion. Rather, he or she may 
qualify as an expert by virtue of his or her "experience" or 
"training." Randle v. Allen. 862 P.2d 1329, 1337 (Utah 1993); 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 
1985). 
A trial court has discretion in determining whether a 
witness is adequately qualified to render an expert opinion. 
Randle, 8 62 P.2d at 1337. That determination will not be 
disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Id. 
Defendant's first challenge to Detective Stephens' opinion 
testimony is a foundational one. Defendant contends that 
Detective Stephens was not a blood spatter expert or an accident 
reconstructionist and that his testimony "ventured into 
substantive areas of scientific evidence" which required 
technical or other specialized knowledge the detective did not 
possess. Br. App. at 35. In other words, defendant challenges 
the detective's qualifications to testify as an expert in this 
case. 
Defendant's argument misapprehends the nature of Detective 
Stephen's testimony. The detective did not testify as a "blood 
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spatter" or "accident reconstruction" expert. Although Detective 
Stephens testified regarding the blood trail and the blood 
pooling, he did not testify regarding any blood spatters or 
patterns. He merely pointed out the blood trail and where it led 
and the blood pooling that occurred where the two victims finally 
fell. He then explained to the jury how the blood fit in 
relation to the evidence and testimony already before the jury. 
The detective was also not called upon to reconstruct an 
"accident." This was a crime scene and the detective was simply 
asked to interpret the physical evidence that he personally 
observed in light of the testimony at trial, and to explain how 
the physical evidence did or did not fit with the testimony of 
the eyewitnesses. 
The question, then, is not whether Detective Stephens was 
qualified as an expert in "blood spatter" or in reconstructing 
accidents. The issue is whether the detective, by virtue of his 
skill, experience, training, or education, had any technical or 
other specialized knowledge regarding the collection and 
interpretation of the type of evidence in this case such that it 
could assist the trier of fact in determining a fact in issue, 
which in this case was whether defendant acted in self-defense. 
Contrary to defendant's assertions, the State laid a more 
than adequate foundation showing that Detective Stephens 
possessed specialized knowledge regarding the interpretation of 
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the kind of physical evidence present in this case. At the time 
of trial, detective had been serving on the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's homicide unit for over two years (Tr. 364). As part of 
his training, Detective Stephens had attended two homicide 
classes, one lasting forty hours and the other three days (Tr. 
376). The two classes included training on evidence gathering, 
blood spatter or pattern identification and directionality, and 
other investigative aids (Tr. 376). The detective had also 
participated in over 800 case conferences with doctors and other 
investigators at the State Medical Examiner's Office (Tr. 376). 
In addition, Detective Stephens had learned through classes, 
attending autopsies, and participating in case conferences, to 
recognize and distinguish between puncture and slashing wounds 
(Tr. 385-86). The detective also knew by virtue of his training 
and experience what a defensive wound was and where it would be 
located (Tr. 385-88). 
Clearly, the detective's training and experience was enough 
to qualify him as an expert who could explain, based on the blood 
trails and pooling, where the two victims were when defendant 
stabbed them, that the two victims sustained puncture rather than 
slashing wounds to the back, that the victims had no wounds to 
the front, and that neither the victims nor the defendant had any 
defensive wounds. See Randle, 862 P.2d at 1337 (trial court did 
not abuse discretion in allowing police officer to testify as 
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expert in accident reconstruction where he had completed 
approximately eighty hours of accident reconstruction training 
and had investigated thousands and reconstructed hundreds of 
traffic accidents over a period of eleven years). 
The detective's training and experience also allowed him to 
explain how the crime probably occurred based on the physical 
evidence that he personally observed and based on the testimony 
of eyewitnesses. In short, the detective's training and 
experience permitted him to state whether the physical evidence 
was consistent with the testimony of the witnesses and defendant. 
Given Detective Stephen's extensive experience in 
investigating violent crimes, the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in allowing him to testify as an expert in this field. 
B. Detective Stephens' testimony was not based on hearsay. 
Defendant next attacks the detective's expert testimony on 
the ground that it was based on hearsay and merely "related out-
of-court information." Defendant asserts, in effect, that the 
detective had no personal knowledge regarding the matters he 
testified to, but merely acted as a conduit for the admission of 
hearsay evidence. 
The record does not support defendant's assertion. First, 
the majority of Detective Stephens' testimony was predicated on 
his personal knowledge. As stated, the detective testified 
regarding the physical evidence that he personally observed and 
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to statements that defendant made to him (Tr. 366, 373-74, 381, 
382-85, 387-89, 403). Second, Detective Stephens' testimony as 
I 
to how the stabbings occurred was based on his personal knowledge 
of the physical evidence in conjunction with the in-court 
testimony of eyewitnesses. 
On direct examination, Detective Stephens testified 
regarding the physical evidence, i.e., the blood trail and 
pooling and the type, number, and location of the stab wounds 
(Tr. 366-89). The detective testified how the stabbings 
occurred, explaining that his theory was based on the physical 
evidence and the statements of eyewitnesses. On cross-
examination, the detective specified that the statements he 
relied on were those of Gilger, Montoya, Rowley, Esparza, 
defendant, and Eloy (Tr. 403). All of those witnesses testified 
at trial, and in fact, Gilger, Montoya, Rowley, and Esparza had 
already testified by the time the detective took the stand (Tr. 
56, 162, 228, 295, 363). The detective was able to listen to all 
the testimony because he sat at counsel table for the State (Tr. 
401). A review of Detective Stephens' testimony demonstrates 
that his opinion was based not on the out-of-court statements of 
eyewitnesses, but on the testimony that the jury heard at trial 
(Tr. 401-69). 
In sum, Detective Stephens' testimony was not based on 
hearsay, but was predicated on his own personal observations and 
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on the in-court statements of eyewitnesses who were subject to 
cross-examination. Consequently, defendant's claim on this point 
is without merit.15 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests this 
Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
JAN GRAHAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
RA B. DUPAIX 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this l^cSlJ 
1998, I mailed, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing Appellee's Brief to Ronald J. Yengich, Counsel for 
Defendant, at 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
841114. 
XT^^^^A^^ 
15As explained in Point II, supra, even if the trial court 
abused its discretion in allowing Detective Stephens to express 
an opinion regarding how the crime occurred, that error was 
harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence contradicting 
defendant's claim of self-defense. 
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ADDENDUM A 
Statutes and Rules 
76-5-103. Aggravated assault 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) Under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
dXa), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or other 
means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (lXa) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (lXb) is a third degree felony. 
381 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 16 
gale 16. Discovery. 
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the de-
fense upon request the following material or information of which he has 
knowledge: 
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefen-
dants; 
(2) the criminal record of the defendant; 
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant; 
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of 
the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of 
the offense for reduced punishment; and 
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the 
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. 
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable follow-
ing the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The 
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure. 
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose 
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or 
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good 
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the 
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case. 
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclo-
sures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a continu-
ing duty to make disclosure. 
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may 
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and informa-
tion may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and 
places. 
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discov-
ery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order 
as is appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to 
make such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to 
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief 
Mowing such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement 
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available 
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal. 
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the 
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the 
court may order such party to permit the discovexy or inspection, grant a 
continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or 
it may enter such other order aa it deems just under the circumstances. 
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Rule 19. Instructions. 
(a) At the dose of the evidence or at such earlier time as the court reason-
ably directs, any party may file written request that the court instruct the 
jury on the law as set forth in the request. At the same time copies of such 
requests shall be furnished to the other parties. The court shall inform counsel 
of its proposed action upon the request; and it shall furnish counsel with a 
copy of its proposed instructions! unless the parties stipulate that such in-
structions may be given orally, or otherwise waive this requirement. 
(b) Upon each written request so presented and given, or refused, the court 
shall endorse its decision and shall initial or sign it. If part be given and part 
refused, the court shall digtingmah, showing by the endorsement what part of 
the charge was given and what part was refused. 
(c) No party may assign as error any portion of the charge or omission 
therefrom unless he objects thereto before the jury is instructed, stating dis-
tinctly the matter to which he objects and the ground of his objection. Not-
withstanding a party's failure to object, error may be assigned to instructions 
in order to avoid a manifest injustice. 
(d) The court shall not comment on the evidence in the case, and if the court 
refers to any of the evidence, it shall instruct the jury that they are the 
exclusive judges of all questions of fact 
(e) Arguments of the respective parties shall be made after the court has 
instructed the juiy. Unless otherwise provided by law, any limitation upon 
time for argument shall be within the discretion of the court. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE Rule 702 
Rule 702. Testimony by experts. 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of 
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, 
may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Advisory Committee Note. — This rale is Discovery of expert's opinion, Rule 26(b)(4), 
the federal rule, verbatim. Rule 56(2), Utah U U C P . 
Rules of Evidence (1971). was substantially the Drug paraphernalia, expert opinion in deter* 
mining nature of object as, § 58-37a-4. 
Cross-Referenees. — Blood tests to deter- Pretrial conference, consideration of limiting 
mine i>arentajp, expert tffimony, Si 78-25-1S
 n u mber of expert witnesses, Rule 16, UHC JP. 
et esq., 78-46V7 to 78-46*4.0. 
ADDENDUM B 
Pertinent Jury Instructions 
T h i r d Judicial District 
NOV 1 4 1996 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT TaL 
spuiy Gurk 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
The State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Jason Joe Martinez, 
Defendant. 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
CASE NO: 961900205 FS 
JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant Jason Joe Martinez is charged by the information 
which has been duly filed with the commission of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT (Two Counts). 
The information alleges: 
COUNT I 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2706 East Bengal Blvd., in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 23, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
5, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant, Jason Joe 
Martinez, a party to the offense, assaulted Brandon Gilger, and intentionally caused serious 
bodily injury to Brandon Gilger; 
COUNT H 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, at 2706 South East Blvd., in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on or about September 23, 1995, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 
5, Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendant Jason Joe 
Martinez, a party to the offense, assaulted Robert J. Montoya, and intentionally caused serious 
bodily injury to Robert J. Montoya. 
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INSTRUCTION NO. S 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and non must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not 
to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, but you are to consider 
the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. [^ 
"Assault" is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, 
to do bodily injury to another; or 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate 
force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or 
violence, that causes bodily injury to another. 
INSTRUCTION NO. [ ^ 
A person commits Aggravated Assault if that person commits 
assault and (a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to 
another; or (b) uses a dangerous weapon or other means or force 
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
INSTRUCTION NO.^/ 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, as charge in Count I 
of the Information, you must find from the evidence each of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted 
Brandon Gilger; and 
2. That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to Brandon Gilger. 
If you find that the evidence establishes each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, the evidence has failed 
to establish one or more of these elements, then you must find 
the defendant, Jason Martinez, not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony, as charge in Count II 
of the Information, you must find from the evidence each of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about September 23, 1995, in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, the defendant, Jason Joe Martinez, assaulted Robert 
Montoya; and 
2. That the defendant intentionally caused serious bodily 
injury to Robert Montoya. 
If you find that the evidence establishes each of the 
foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty. If, on the other hand, the evidence has failed 
to establish one or more of these elements, then you must find 
the defendant, Jason Martinez, not guilty. 
6 
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INSTRUCTION NO. ^ > 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one of your members to act as 
foreperson, who, as foreperson, will preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdict in this case must be either: 
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count I 
of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count I, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a First Degree Felony; 
or 
Guilty of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony, as charged in Count II 
of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count II, AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Second Degree Felony; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, an unanimous concurrence of all jurors is required to find a 
verdict. Your verdict must be in writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreman and then returned by you to this Court. When your verdict has been found, notify the 
bailiff that you are readvjD report to the Court. 
4 Dated this fw* day of November, 1996 
FRANK 
DISTRIC 
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ADDENDUM C 
Affidavit of Defense Trial Counsel 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OP UTAH, DIVISION I 
STATE OP UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT BREEZE 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
JASON MARTINEZ ) Case No. 961900205 
Defendant. ) Honorable Frank Noel 
COMES NOW Robert Breeze being first duly sworn upon his oath 
to declare as true the following: 
1. I was trial counsel for Jason Martinez in the above 
captioned case. 
2. My recollection of the facts and circumstances regarding 
Jury Instruction #15 is as follows: 
a. Instruction No. 15 originally appeared as State's 
proposed Instruction #_L2J , although my copy of the State's 
proposed instruction were not numbered. 
b. Following the close of evidence, counsel and the 
Court met in chambers to discuss instructions without a reporter 
present. When we arrived in Judge Noel's chambers the Court 
already had a basic set of instructions including instructions 
culled from Defendant's and Plaintiff's proposed instructions. 
c. As I recall, there was a brief exchange between 
myself and prosecutor David Walsh as we entered the judge's office 
wherein Mr. Walsh vaguely referred to a lesser included, 3rd degree 
use of a weapon instruction. I expressed my intent to object on 
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the grounds that we hadn't had a preliminary hearing on that 
charge. I do not believe the matter was discussed further. 
d. The Court while still in chambers decided which 
instruction he would give (which did not include Instruction #15) 
and advised that objections could be made on the record once we got 
back in Court. 
e. The Court then gave his instructions to someone for 
copying at which time Judge Noel, Mr. Walsh and I returned to the 
courtroom. 
f. The judge then allowed on the record objections to 
instructions. I made several objections, none of which related to 
No. 15, due to the fact that I was unaware at that time that 
Instruction No. 15 was in the packet. My objections came from: 
notes I had made in the Judge's chambers. 
g. Our objections to instructions were noted and the 
jury was brought back to the courtroom. 
h. The Court then began reading the instructions to the 
jury. I was reviewing my closing statement as the Court read the 
instructions to the jury. When the Court began reading No. 15 I 
immediately noted a problem and flipped to Instruction No. 15. I 
knew that this instruction should not have been included. At that 
moment I considered interrupting the judge and pointing out the 
error, however, I decided to wait until the instructions were 
complete for a more opportune time to advise the Court of the error 
because I felt, based on the vibes of the jury members, that any 
interruption of the judge during instructions by the defense would 
cause resentment against the defense. I then did a final mental 
review of my closing statement. When the Court finished the 
instructions Judge Noel immediately directed Mr. Walsh to commence 
his closing statement. I did not make an objection to No. 15 prior 
to the commencement of Mr. Walsh's closing statement. I do not 
recall whether I failed to ask for a curative instruction because 
I felt that interrupting would cause bad feelings against the 
defense by the jurors and that the error was not of great 
significance to our self defense theory, whether I simply 
overlooked the error once we were into closing arguments, whether 
I made a split second decision not to object because the error was 
plain and would benefit my client in the event of an adverse 
verdict, or because of a combination of the above. 
i. After the guilty verdicts I returned to my office to 
review the file for appellate issues while everything was fresh in 
my mind and clearly remember again noting Instruction No. 15 and 
making plans for post trial relief at that time. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
State of Utah ) 
ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me by ROBERT BREEZE on 
this >^ ?/ft day of February, 1997. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
DENNIS MILLER 
160 E. 300 So. 2nd a 
S.L.CUT 84111 
COMMISSION EXPIRES 
JUNE 5,2000 
STATE OF UTAH 
Notary Public, State of Utah 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
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